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Abstract
We study two aspects of noisy computations during inference. The first aspect is how to
mitigate their side effects for naturally trained deep learning systems. One of the mo-
tivations for looking into this problem is to reduce the high power cost of conventional
computing of neural networks through the use of analog neuromorphic circuits. Traditional
GPU/CPU-centered deep learning architectures exhibit bottlenecks in power-restricted ap-
plications (e.g., embedded systems). The use of specialized neuromorphic circuits, where
analog signals passed through memory-cell arrays are sensed to accomplish matrix-vector
multiplications, promises large power savings and speed gains but brings with it the prob-
lems of limited precision of computations and unavoidable analog noise. We manage to
improve inference accuracy from 21.1% to 99.5% for MNIST images, from 29.9% to 89.1%
for CIFAR10, and from 15.5% to 89.6% for MNIST stroke sequences with the presence of
strong noise (with signal-to-noise power ratio being 0 dB) by noise-injected training and a
voting method. This observation promises neural networks that are insensitive to inference
noise, which reduces the quality requirements on neuromorphic circuits and is crucial for
their practical usage.
The second aspect is how to utilize the noisy inference as a defensive architecture against
black-box adversarial attacks. During inference, by injecting proper noise to signals in the
neural networks, the robustness of adversarially-trained neural networks against black-box
attacks has been further enhanced by 0.5% and 1.13% for two adversarially trained models
for MNIST and CIFAR10, respectively.
Keywords: deep learning, noisy inference, adversarial attacks
1. Introduction
Neural networks (NNs) [1, 2] are layered computational networks that try to imitate the
function of neurons in a human brain during object recognition, decision making, and other
cognitive tasks. They are one of the most widely used machine learning techniques due to
their good performance in practice. Certain variants of neural networks were shown to be
more suitable for different learning applications. For instance, deep convolutional neural
networks (CNNs) [3, 4] were found to be effective at recognizing and classifying images.
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Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) [5, 6] provide stronger performance at sequence predic-
tions, e.g. speech or text recognition. A neural network is determined by the connections
between the neurons and weights/biases associated with them which are trained using the
back-propagation algorithm [7, 8].
In order to fit highly non-linear functions and thus to achieve a high rate of correctness
in practice, neural networks usually contain many layers, each containing a large number
of weights. The most power- and time-consuming computation of a neural networks is
the matrix-vector multiplication between weights and incoming signals. In power-restricted
applications, such as an inference engine in an embedded system, the size of the neural
networks is effectively limited by the power consumption of the computations. One attractive
method of lowering this power consumption is by use of neuromorphic computing [9], where
analog signals passed through memory-cell arrays are sensed to accomplish matrix-vector
multiplications. Here weights are programmed as conductances (reciprocal of resistivity) of
memory cells in a two-dimensional array, such as resistive RAM (ReRAM), phase-change
RAM (PCM) or NAND Flash [10]. According to Ohm’s law, if input signals are presented as
voltages to this layer of memory cells, the output current is the matrix-vector multiplication
of the weights and the input signals. The massive parallelism of this operation also promises
significant savings in latency over sequential digital computations.
One of the problems with neuromorphic computing is the limited precision of the com-
putations, since the programming of memory cells, as well as the measurement of the analog
outputs, inevitably suffers from analog noise, which affects performance of deep learning sys-
tems in a harmful way. Some researchers have proposed to correct the errors between A/D
and D/A converters of each layer [11, 12], which induces extra overhead in latency, space,
and power as well. Existing noisy inference literature for neuromorphic computing is mostly
in the device/circuit domain, typically focusing on redesigning memory devices/circuits to
reduce the noise power. But to our knowledge, the exploration of robustness of neural net-
works against analog and noisy computations inside the network in an algorithmic point of
view has not been studied in detail. It is the first goal of this paper to present methods and
observations to mitigate the harmful effects brought by inference noise.
During its study, we find out that noisy inference can also be helpful to defend against
black-box adversarial attacks of neural networks, the resistance of which is becoming more
crucial for a wide range of applications, such as deep learning systems deployed in financial
institutions and autonomous driving. Adversarial attacks manipulate inputs to a neural net-
works and generate adversarial examples that have rarely perceptible differences to a natural
image, but they lead to incorrect predictions [13]. White-box attacks can be categorized into
three categories.
• Single step attack, e.g., fast gradient sign methods (FGSM) [14],
x∗ = x+  · sign(∇xJ(x, y)),
where x and x∗ is the natural and adversarial examples, respectively.  is the upper
bound on the L∞ distance between x and x∗. J(x, y) is the loss function for an input
x being predicted to have label y and ∇x is the derivative operator with respect to
input x.
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• Iterative methods, e.g., iterative FGSM [15],
x∗0 = x, x
∗
t+1 = Clipx, (x
∗
t + α · sign(∇xJ(x∗t , y))) ,
where α is the learning rate of the adversary, Clipx,(·) is a function that clips the
output to be within the -cube of x such that the L∞ distance between x∗t and x is
always less than or equal to .
• Optimization based attacks, e.g., [16],
arg min
x∗
λ||x− x∗||p + J(x∗, y),
where λ balances the Lp norm distortion and the loss function.
Black-box attacks are possible based on the transferability [17] of adversary such that
adversarial examples generated from one neural network often lead to incorrect predictions
of another independently trained neural network.
Several defensive mechanisms such as distillations [18], feature squeezing [19], and ad-
versary detection [20], are proposed against attacks. [21] models the process as a min-max
problem and builds a universal framework for attacking and defensive schemes, where it tries
to provide a guaranteed performance for the first-order attacks, i.e., attacks based soly on
derivatives. They also suggested that adversarial training with projected gradient descent
(PGD) provides a strongest robustness against first-order attacks. Based on their study, we
further investigate noisy inference of adversarially trained neural networks. Experimental
results show improvement on robustness against black-box adversarial attacks and indicate
that adversarial examples are more sensitive to inference noise than natural examples.
The contribution of this paper is summarized as follows.
1. We model the analog noise of neuromorphic circuits as additive and multiplicative
Gaussian noise. The impact on accuracy of noisy inference is shown to be severe by three
neural network architectures (a regular CNN, a DenseNet [22], and a LSTM-based RNN)
for three datasets (MNIST, CIFAR10, and MNIST stroke sequences [23]), e.g., when noise
power equals the signal power, the accuracy is as low as (21.1%, 29.9%, 10.1%), respectively.
2. We observe that the performance of noisy inference can be greatly improved by
injecting noises to all layers in the neural networks during training. Noise-injected training
was used as a regularization tool for better model generalization, but its application to
noisy inference has not been studied in details. We provide a quantitative measurement
on the impact that the inference noise has on noiseless-trained and noise-injected trained
neural networks, where the power of training and inference noise might not match. The
performance of noisy inference with low-to-medium noise power is improved to almost as
good as noiseless inference. For large noise power (equal to signal power), the accuracy is
increased to (77.7%, 66.9%, 66.9%) for the three datasets, respectively.
3. We further improve the performance of noisy inference by proposing a voting mecha-
nism for large noise power. The accuracy has been further increased to (99.5%, 89.1%, 89.6%)
for the three datasets when noise power equals the signal power. In addition, we observe that
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with noise-injected training and the proposed voting mechanism combined, noisy inference
can give higher accuracy (0.5%) than noiseless inference for LSTM-based recurrent neu-
ral networks, which is counterintuitive since it is often believed that noise during inference
would be harmful rather than helpful to the accuracy.
4. A further study on adversarially trained neural networks for MNIST and CIFAR10
has shown that noisy inference improves the robustness of deep neural networks against
black-box attacks. The accuracy of adversarial examples has been improved by 0.5% and
1.13% (in absolute values) for MNIST and CIFAR10 when validated on a separately and
adversarially trained CNN and DenseNet, respectively.
2. Preliminaries
A neural network contains input neurons, hidden neurons, and output neurons. It can be
viewed as a function f : X → Y where the input x ∈ X ⊆ Rn is an n-dimensional vector and
the output y ∈ Y ⊆ Rm is an m-dimensional vector. In this paper, we focus on classification
problems where the output y = (y1, . . . , ym) is usually normalized such that
∑m
i=1 yi = 1 and
yi can be viewed as the probability for some input x to be categorized as the i-th class. The
normalization is often done by the softmax function that maps an arbitrary m-dimensional
vector yˆ into normalized y, denoted by y = softmax(yˆ), as yi =
exp(yˆi)∑m
i=1 exp(yˆi)
, i = 1, . . . ,m.
For top-k decision problems, we return the top k categories with the largest output yi.
In particular for hard decision problems where k = 1, the classification results is then
arg maxi yi, i = 1, . . . ,m.
A feed-forward neural network f that contains n layers (excluding the softmax output
layer) can be expressed as a concatenation of n functions fi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n such that f =
fn(fn−1(· · · f1(x) · · · )). The ith layer fi : Xi → Yi satisfies Yi ⊆ Xi+1, X1 = X . The output
of last layer Yn is then fed into the softmax function. The function fi is usually defined as
fi(x) = g(W · x+ b), (1)
where W is the weights matrix, b is the bias vector, and g(·) is an element-wise activation
function that is usually nonlinear, e.g., tanh, sigmoid, rectified linear unit (ReLU) [24] and
leaky ReLU [25]. Both W and b are trainable parameters.
In this paper, two noise models are assumed, which are additive Gaussian noise model
z ∼ N (0, σ2) and multiplicative Gaussian noise model z ∼ N (1, σ2), respectively, in the
forward pass after each matrix-vector multiplication. Then Eq. (1) becomes
fi(x) = g(W · x+ b+ z), (2)
for additive Gaussian noise or
fi(x) = g((W · x+ b) · z) (3)
for multiplicative Gaussian noise. Additive Gaussian noise z ∼ N (0, σ2) models procedures
of neuromorphic computing where the noise power is irrelevant to the signals, such as signal
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sensing, memory reading, and some random electrical perturbation of circuits. On the other
hand for multiplicative noises, we can show that multiplying a unit-mean Gaussian random
variable Z to a signal X is equivalent to adding a zero-mean Gaussian random variable Z ′
to the signal where the standard deviation of Z ′ is proportional to the magnitude of the
signal, as
XZ = X(1 + Z ′) = X +XZ ′, (4)
where XZ ′ ∼ N (0, σ2X2) = N (0, (|X|σ)2). Therefore, multiplicative noise models the
procedures where the noise power is proportional to the signal power, such as memory
programming and computations.
For both additive and multiplicative Gaussian noise models, we denote σtrain and σval
the standard deviation of the noise during training and validation (inference), respectively.
We denote σtrain,+, σval,+, σtrain,×, σval,× if specific additive or multiplicative noise models
are referred to. Note that σtrain is usually set to be 0 in conventional training; Nonetheless,
random noise is sometimes injected (σtrain > 0) during training to provide better general-
ization. Conventional deep learning architecture assumes σval = 0 since digital circuits are
assumed to have no errors during computations.
For both noisy models, the signal-to-noise power ratio (SNR) is a defining parameter
that measures the strength of the noise relative to the signal, which is defined as the ratio
between the power of signal and noise. It is usually expressed in dB where SNR(dB) =
10 log10(SNR(value)). For example, if the signal and noise has the same power, SNR = 1
(or 0 dB). For multiplicative noise models, we have constant SNR = 1
σ2val,×
; on the other
hand, SNRs for additive noise models with fixed σval,+’s depend highly on signal power and
it would be a fair comparison only if the signal power is invariant. Therefore, we mainly use
multiplicative noise models in our experiment except for the case where we can normalize
the signals to have constant power.
3. Robustness of NNs against Noisy Inference
In this section we explore the robustness of neural networks against noisy computations
modeled in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). We will show the robustness of different neural network
architectures for different datasets against noisy inference and provide two techniques that
improve the robustness, namely, noise-injected training and voting.
3.1. Datasets and NN architectures
Three datasets are used in our experiments, which are MNIST images (60000 for training
and 10000 for validation), CIFAR10 images (50000 for training, 10000 for validation, no data
augmentation applied), and the stroke sequence of MNIST [23] for each MNIST image.
For MNIST images, we use a 6-layer convolutional neural network described in Table 1.
The noiseless trained model has prediction accuracy of 99.5% for noiseless inference. For
multiplicative Gaussian noise models, the parameters in batch normalization layers are train-
able. However, for additive Gaussian noise models, we use batch normalization layers with
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Table 1: A 6-layer CNN architecture for MNIST
Layer Output shape
Conv. 2D (3, 3) - Batch Norm (β, γ) (26, 26, 32)
Gaussian Noise - ReLu (26, 26, 32)
Conv. 2D (3, 3) - Batch Norm (β, γ) (24, 24, 32)
Gaussian Noise - ReLu (24, 24, 32)
Maxpooling (12, 12, 32)
Conv. 2D (3, 3) - Batch Norm (β, γ) (10, 10, 64)
Gaussian Noise - ReLu (10, 10, 64)
Conv. 2D (3, 3) - Batch Norm (β, γ) (8, 8, 64)
Gaussian Noise - ReLu (8, 8, 64)
Maxpooling (4, 4, 64)
Fully connected - Batch Norm (β, γ) (256)
Gaussian Noise - ReLu (256)
Fully connected - Gaussian Noise (10)
fixed parameters β = 0, γ = 1 (as opposed to trainable mean and variance) to minimize the
signal power variations for the reason mentioned in Section 2.
For CIFAR10, we use a densely connected convolutional neural network (DenseNet) [22].
DenseNet is an enhanced version of ResNet [26] where all feature maps of previous layers are
presented as the input to later convolutional layers. The depth of the DenseNet is 40 and
growth rate is 12. All parameters in convolutional, fully-connected and batch normalization
layers are trainable since fixed batch normalization parameters cannot provide satisfactory
accuracy even if the inference is noiseless. The total number of trainable parameters of the
DenseNet is around one million. The noiseless trained model has prediction accuracy of
92.5% with noiseless inference, which is slightly below the reported value (93%) in [26]. We
inject multiplicative Gaussian noise after each matrix-vector multiplication.
For MNIST stroke sequences extracted by [23], we use a LSTM-based recurrent neural
network with 50 cells corresponding to the first 50 two dimensional coordinates of pen-points
of each written digit. If the total number of pen-points is less than 50, it is padded with
(0, 0)’s. Since the pen-points are two dimensional, the input dimension to each LSTM cell is
2. The number of hidden units in each cell is 128, and the last LSTM cell are connected with
an output layer of 10 neurons for classification. The noiselessly trained model has accuracy
around 95% with noiseless inference. The drop of accuracy from MNIST images to MNIST
stroke sequences may due to that we have to truncate or pad pen-points to fit the 50 LSTM
cells and gray level information is lost when converting images to stroke sequences. There
are four matrix-vector multiplications in each LSTM cell (see four yellow boxes in LSTM
cells in Fig. 1) and one between the LSTM cell and the output layer, where multiplicative
noise are injected.
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Figure 1: Example of LSTM cells.
3.2. Noisy Inference by Noiseless and Noise-Injected Training
In this section, we show the impact of noisy inference on accuracy for noiselessly and
noise-injected trained models. The noise-injected training applies noise layers during train-
ing and thus the information in the forward pass is changed and consequently influences
the weight updates during backward pass. We train models with different σtrain’s and use
different σval’s to test the accuracy on all trained models. That is, the noise power in train-
ing does not necessarily match the noise power during inference. We will show that such
noise-injected training uniformly improves accuracy on all σval’s.
3.2.1. The CNN for MNIST images
For MNIST images with the 6-layer CNN architecture, we train 100 epochs using stochas-
tic mini-batch training with Adam optimizer and batch size being 32 for each σtrain = 0.0
to 1.0 with a step size of 0.1. The accuracy of noiselessly trained model (σtrain = 0) with
noiseless inference (σval = 0) is around 99.5%. Then the 11 trained models are tested on
validation set with σval = 0.0 to 1.0 with a step size of 0.1. We present the results of a sub-
set of σtrain’s in Figure 2. Validation accuracy for each (σtrain, σval) pair is the average of 50
independent runs and we observe that all 50 results are highly concentrated in their average
(within less than 1% variation). This phenomenon is also confirmed from neural network
models for other datasets, thus we use the average accuracy as a measurement of robustness
against noisy inference. Also note that y-axis represents the error rate (1−accuracy) in
logarithm scale. Table 2 and Table 3 summarize the results. The first row is the inference
noise levels from σval = 0.0 to 1.0 with a step size of 0.2; the second row shows the accuracy
for noiselessly trained models; the third row shows the best accuracy for σval in that column,
which is achieved by noise-injected training with σtrain in the fourth row.
Table 2: Accuracy of noisy inference for multiplicative noise models for MNIST images.
σval,× 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
σtrain,×=0 99.5% 99.3% 93.5% 65.7% 38.8% 21.1%
Best accu. 99.6% 99.5% 99.3% 94.6% 86.1% 77.7%
By σtrain,× 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0
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Table 3: Accuracy of noisy inference for additive noise models for MNIST images.
σval,+ 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
σtrain,+=0 99.5% 99.3% 95.8% 80.5% 58.8% 38.7%
Best 99.6% 99.5% 99.4% 99.2% 99.0% 98.4%
By σtrain,+ 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.0
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Figure 2: Validation accuracy of the 6-layer CNN with Gaussian noise for different (σtrain, σval) pairs. (a)
Multiplicative noise model. (b) Additive noise model.
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There are some observations that we can make from Table 2, Table 3, and Figure 2.
1. Conventional noiseless training (σtrain = 0) does not provide satisfactory performance
against noisy inference even when the noise power is from low to medium (second row in
Table 2 and Table 3). For example, when σval = 0.4, the accuracy reduces by 5.8% and 3.6%
for multiplicative and additive noise models, respectively.
2. If the inference noise power is known, training with properly injected noise can greatly
improve noisy inference (third and fourth row in Table 2 and Table 3) when the noise power
is from low to medium (e.g,. accuracy decreases less than 0.2% when σval,× ≤ 0.4 and less
than 0.3% when σval,+ ≤ 0.6). Note that σval,× is the ratio between standard deviations of
noise and magnitude of signals and tolerating σval,× = 0.4 (SNR = 7.96 dB) is already a
good relaxation on the requirement for neuromorphic circuits.
3. If the inference noise power is unknown, noise-injected training with a specified σtrain
also provides consistent accuracy improvement for low-to-medium values of inference noise
power (Figure 2). For example, the accuracy decreases less than 0.2% when σtrain = 0.4 for
all inference noise level σval ≤ 0.4 in both multiplicative and additive noise models.
We further investigate the learning speed and the weights of noise injected training. The
result for multiplicative noise models is presented in Figure 3, where the learning curve
(validation accuracy and loss) for the first 25000 stochastic mini-batches of size 32 is shown.
It can be observed that higher noise power in training generally results in a lower training
speed (with learning rate is fixed to be 0.0001). Table 4 shows the expected L2 norm of
weights for 11 trained CNN models with different σtrain,×. It can be seen that the magnitude
of weights for σtrain,× > 0 are similar and are slightly greater than noiselessly trained model.
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Figure 3: Learning curves of the noise injected training for σtrain,× = 0.0 to 1.0.
In order to understand the difference between models from noiseless and noise-injected
training, we choose two 6-layer CNN models, corresponding to σtrain,× = 0.0 and 1.0, and
run multiplicative noisy inference with σval,× = 0.0 to 1.0 for 10000 times for one same image
9
Table 4: Expected L2 norm of all weights of 11 models
σtrain,× 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5√
E(w2) 0.049 0.054 0.054 0.059 0.060 0.060
σtrain,× 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0√
E(w2) 0.058 0.056 0.060 0.058 0.059
(which has label “6”) and then plot the distributions of 10 outputs after the softmax layers,
which can be thought as the probability of that image being classified as the corresponding
digits. Figure 4 and Figure 5 shows the evolution of the output distributions with increasing
σval,×. Note that the upper right part in each of the six plots indicates higher probability
of having large output values. Therefore, it is likely for the neural network to predict the
image as labels/curves that appear in that area. It can be seen that noiselessly trained
model (Figure 4) starts to be confused with digit “6” (pink) and “8” (dark yellow) when
σval,× ≥ 0.6; on the other hand, noise-injected training constantly favors the prediction of
“6”.
Figure 4: Distribution of the 10 softmax output for MNIST. Model based on conventional training at
σtrain,× = 0.0, inference with validation noise σval,× = 0 to 1.0 at a step of 0.2.
3.2.2. A Depth-40 DenseNet for CIFAR10
We train the non-augmented dataset of CIFAR10 for 300 epochs using momentum
optimizer with mini-batch of size 32. We inject multiplicative Gaussian noise right af-
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Figure 5: Distribution of the 10 softmax output for MNIST. Model based on noise-injected training at
σtrain,× = 1.0, inference with validation noise σval,× = 0 to 1.0 at a step of 0.2.
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ter each matrix-vector multiplication. Figure 6 shows the average accuracy for pairs of
(σtrain,×, σval,×), where Table 5 summarizes the results.
Similar to the 6-layer CNN for MNIST images, we can also conclude from Table 5
and Figure 6 for the multiplicative noise models that noise-injected training provides large
robustness gain against noisy inference, e.g., accuracy decreases less than 1.3% (see Table 5)
if σval,× ≤ 0.4 (SNR = 7.96 dB).
Table 5: Accuracy of noisy inference for multiplicative noise models for CIFAR10.
σval,× 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
σtrain,×=0 92.5% 91.9% 88.5% 78.7% 60.4% 29.9%
Best 92.8% 92.4% 91.5% 85.6% 75.7% 66.9%
By σtrain,× 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Figure 6: Validation accuracy of the depth-40 DenseNet with Gaussian noise for different (σtrain,×, σval,×)
pairs.
3.2.3. LSTMs for MNIST stroke sequences
This section provides results on classifying stroke sequences on MNIST. We train LSTM-
based RNNs for 100 epochs with stochastic mini-batch of batchsize 32 with Adam optimizer,
where multiplicative noise are injected after four matrix-vector multiplications within the
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LSTM cells and one for the final output layer. Figure 7 shows the accuracy for different
(σtrain,×, σval,×) pairs and Table 6 summarizes the results. The accuracy for noise-injected
training decreases less than 1.3% when σval,× ≤ 0.4, providing much larger robustness than
noiseless training against noisy inference.
Table 6: Accuracy of noisy inference for multiplicative noise models for MNIST stroke sequences.
σval,× 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
σtrain,×=0 94.8% 88.0% 49.8% 23.6% 17.0% 15.5%
Best accu. 95.6% 95.7% 94.3% 87.3% 77.0% 66.9%
By σtrain,× 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Figure 7: Validation accuracy of LSTM-based RNNs for different (σtrain,×, σval,×) pairs.
3.3. Noisy Inference with Voting
Inspired by the comparison of Figure 4 and Figure 5, we find many instances where the
correct prediction is favored in the histogram however not correctly predicted when σval is
large, e.g., 1.0. The reason is that the prediction is probabilistic, i.e., if there is a small
overlap in the histogram, e.g., 10%, between the favored correct label and a wrong label, the
accuracy will be reduces by around 10%. Observing that the correct prediction appears more
often in multiple runs of independent noisy inference, we propose a voting mechanism that
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can magnify the favored label based on Law of Large Numbers, where we collect a number
of predictions of noisy inference and claim the prediction with the most votes (also known
as the mode) as the final prediction. Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10 show a detailed
comparison for inference with voting (b) and without voting (a), where three (a) sub-figures
are replots of Figure 2(a), Figure 6, and Figure 7 for comparing purposes. Table 7, Table 8,
and Table 9 summarize the results, where the second row repeats the best accuracy for
noise-injected training and the third row are the best accuracy achieved by 20 votes on
noisy inference using neural network models trained with σtrain,× equal to the corresponding
column in the fourth row.
We can make a few observations based on Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10, Table 7, Table 8,
and Table 9.
1. While the accuracy in low-to-medium σval,× (i.e., high SNR) regime is similar, voting
further improves the accuracy of all three neural networks for three datasets when the noise
power is large (σval,× close to 1.0). For example, when σval,× = 1.0 (SNR = 0 dB), accu-
racy is improved by more than 20%, from (77.7%, 66.9%, 66.9%) to (99.5%, 89.1%, 89.6%)
for MNIST images, CIFAR10, and MNIST stroke sequences, respectively. Compared hor-
izontally, accuracy maintains almost the same (99.6% vs 99.5%) for MNIST images when
σval,× = 1.0 (SNR=1 in value or 0 dB). Noise-injected training without voting has such
high accuracy only when σval,× ≤ 0.2 (SNR=25 in value or 14 dB), where a 14 dB gain is
realized by voting. Similarly, the tolerable σval,× increases from 0.4 to 0.8 (a 6 dB SNR gain)
for DenseNet of CIFAR10 if 1.5% accuracy loss is acceptable; the tolerable σval,× increases
from 0.4 to 0.6 (a 3.5 dB SNR gain) for LSTMs of MNIST stroke sequences if 1% accuracy
loss is acceptable. Such SNR gains further relax the requirements for neuromorphic circuit
designs and enable them to have competitive accuracy with GPU/CPU centered digital
computations.
2. We observe in Table 6 that with voting and noise-injected training combined, noisy
inference improves 0.5% accuracy upon noiseless inference for LSTM-based recurrent neural
networks, which is counterintuitive since it is often believed that noise during inference would
be harmful rather than helpful to the performance. The improvement by noisy inference is
also confirmed by independently training multiple LSTM models.
Table 7: Accuracy of noisy inference by voting for multiplicative noise models for MNIST images.
σval,× 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
No voting 99.6% 99.5% 99.3% 94.6% 86.1% 77.7%
Best voting 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 99.5%
By σtrain,× 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9
Having observed the benefits of the voting mechanism, we then discuss how to miti-
gate their weakness in practical applications since latency and power consumption will be
increased when a prediction is made by multiple runs of noisy inference. Fig. 11(a) and
(b) shows the trade-offs between the number of votes and accuracy for MNIST images and
CIFAR10, respectively. It can be seen that the accuracy improves fast when the number
14
Table 8: Accuracy of noisy inference by voting for multiplicative noise models for CIFAR10.
σval,× 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
No voting 92.8% 92.4% 91.5% 85.6% 75.7% 66.9%
Best voting 92.8% 92.7% 92.7% 92.8% 91.3% 89.1%
By σtrain,× 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.8
Table 9: Accuracy of noisy inference by voting for multiplicative noise models for MNIST stroke sequences.
σval,× 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
No voting 95.6% 95.7% 94.3% 87.3% 77.0% 66.9%
Best voting 95.6% 96.1% 95.9% 94.6% 92.7% 89.6%
By σtrain,× 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
P(
err
or)
 = 
1 -
 ac
cu
rac
y
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
P(
err
or)
 = 
1 -
 ac
cu
rac
y
Figure 8: Validation accuracy of the 6-layer CNN for MNIST with multiplicative Gaussian noise of different
(σtrain,×, σval,×) pairs. (a) One single inference. (b) Inference by voting with 20 runs.
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Figure 9: Validation accuracy of the depth-40 DenseNet for CIFAR10 with multiplicative Gaussian noise of
different (σtrain,×, σval,×) pairs. (a) One single inference. (b) Inference by voting with 20 runs.
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Figure 10: Validation accuracy of the LSTM-based RNN for MNIST stroke sequences with multiplicative
Gaussian noise of different (σtrain,×, σval,×) pairs. (a) One single inference. (b) Inference by voting with 20
runs.
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of votes increases from 1 to 10, in particular for large noise power. Beyond 10 votes, the
accuracy curve becomes almost flat. Fast convergence of the voting is particularly critical
for neuromorphic circuits-based deep neural networks to have smaller latency and power
overhead.
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Figure 11: Trade-offs between number of votes and the accuracy of noisy inference for MNIST images (a)
and CIFAR10 (b).
The latency overhead can be reduced in two ways. If the chip area is not a bottle-
neck, then multiple inference can be made in parallel from multiple copies of neuromorphic
circuits-based neural networks, resulting in zero latency overhead. Otherwise, it can also be
minimized by pipelining multiple inference on a single neuromorphic circuits-based neural
network. Each layer of a neural network can be implemented as one memory array and
instead of waiting for one inference to finish before the next one to start, images can be fed
into the neuromorphic computing system at each time stamp and all layers form a pipeline.
Assume the number of layers is L, each layer contributes latency T , and the number of votes
is K, then the overall latency with pipelining is (L+K)T (instead of KLT without pipelin-
ing). Compared to the latency of LT for a single inference, the overhead (L+K)T−LT
LT
= K
L
is
slightly greater than 0 for large L, i.e., deeper neural networks, which is becoming widely
used in practice.
If a single inference costs power P , then the power consumption of K votes would be
KP , which cannot be reduced by parallel computing or pipelining. However, P ∝ V 2, where
V is the memory programming/sensing voltage, and V is positively related to SNRs, which
is the inverse of σ2val. Therefore, smaller V brings with it smaller power consumption at the
cost of increasing σval. The trade-offs between power consumption and accuracy, connected
by V and σval is complicated and beyond the scope of this paper.
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4. Noisy Inference as a Defensive Mechanism for Black-box Adversarial Attacks
We show in this section that noisy inference can enhance adversarially trained neural
networks against black-box adversarial attacks. Noisy inference provides stochastic gradients
which has been shown in [27] to provide a false sense of security against white-box attacks.
However, we observe that the transferability of adversarial examples from one neural network
to the other has been weaker if the neural networks used for prediction have noisy inference.
We focus on L∞ attacks where all pixel values of an adversarial example are within an -cube
of a natural one. Our experiments are setup as follows.
1. We use two datasets, MNIST images and CIFAR10 where all pixel values are normal-
ized between 0 and 1.
2. The adversarial attacks are iterative fast gradient sign methods (FGSM) with pro-
jected gradient descent (PGD) and multiple restarts from a random image within the -cube
of a natural image. It is shown to be a strongest attack based on first-order statistics [21].
The detailed parameters of the attacks are listed in Table 10.
MNIST CIFAR10
 0.3 8
256
Adv. learn. rate 0.05 2
256
Iterations 20 7
No. restarts 20 10
Table 10: Parameters of adversarial attacks (iterative FGSM).
3. Two neural networks are noiselessly (σtrain = 0.0) and adversarially trained [21], where
each minibatch of size 32 consists of equal number of natural and adversarial samples. One
neural network is used to generate adversarial examples (denoted by NNadv) and the other is
used to validate the accuracy of those adversarial examples (denoted by NNval). For MNIST,
NNadv is a 4-layer CNN as it is in [21] and NNval is the 6-layer CNN we presented in Table 1.
Both neural networks are adversarially trained for 100 epochs. For CIFAR10, NNadv is the
depth-40 Densenet with growth rate 12 and NNval is a depth-100 Densenet with growth rate
12. Both neural networks are adversarially trained for 300 epochs.
Tabel 11 shows the average validation accuracy for MNIST and CIFAR10 under black-
box attacks with 20 runs of noisy inference. It can be observed that the robustness of
the adversarially trained neural networks (the 6-layer CNN and the depth-100 Densenet)
against the attacks has been further enhanced from 97.40% to 97.90% and from 66.52%
to 67.65%, respectively. The 0.5% and 1.13% improvements are achieved by multiplicative
noisy inference with σval,× = 0.2 and 0.1, respectively.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose to use training with injected noise and inference with voting
that imbues neural networks with much greater resilience to imperfect computations during
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MNIST CIFAR10
σval,× = 0.0 97.40% 66.52%
σval,× = 0.1 97.79% 67.65%
σval,× = 0.2 97.90% 67.43%
σval,× = 0.3 97.71% 66.57%
σval,× = 0.4 97.00% 63.39%
Table 11: Accuracy of black-box attacks on MNIST and CIFAR10 for different inference noise levels σval,×.
inference, which has potential applications on deep learning with ultra-low power consump-
tions. Three examples of neural network architectures show remarkable improvement on
accuracy using these two methods. With strong noise (σval,× = 1), these two methods can im-
prove accuracy from (21.1%, 29.9%, 15.5%) to (99.5%, 89.1%, 89.6%) for the three datasets,
respectively. With low-to-medium values of noise power (σval,× ≤ 0.4), noise-injected train-
ing itself can improve accuracy from (95.8%, 88.5%, 49.8%) to (99.4%, 91.5%, 94.3%) for the
three datasets at no cost of latency or power consumption.
Further study of black-box attacks against neural networks show 0.5% and 1.13% en-
hancement for MNIST and CIFAR10, which is brought by noisy inference on adversarially
trained neural networks.
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